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Submission Titel: Beyond Decisionmaking: The Dynamics of Muddling Through 
Abstract 
An alternative to conventional models of decisionmaking is presented. In contrast to 
models that treat decisionmaking as an open-loop, independent choice, this article suggests that 
in practice decisionmaking is more typically a closed-loop, dynamic, problem solving process. 
The article suggests five important distinctions between the processes assumed by conventional 
models and the reality of practical decisionmaking. It is suggested that the logic of abduction in 
the form of an adaptive, muddling through process is more consistent with the realities of 
practice in domains such as healthcare. The practical implication is that the design goal should 
not be to improve consistency with normative models of rationality, but to tune the 
representations guiding the muddling process to increase functional perspicacity. 
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Beyond Decisionmaking: The Dynamics of Muddling 
Through 
Introduction 
When Gary Klein began interviewing firefighters in the early phases of his explorations 
of decisionmaking in complex work domains, he ran into an unexpected problem. A common 
response from the firefighters he interviewed was that they didn’t make decisions, they put out 
fires. Klein [1] writes “to hear them describe it, they didn’t really consider anything; they just 
acted.” 
Winograd and Flores [2] made a very similar point in discussing decisionmaking in 
relation to management. They suggested that “instead of talking about ‘decisions’ or ‘problems’ 
we can talk about ‘situations of irresolution,’ in which we sense conflict about an answer to the 
question ‘What needs to be done?’” (p.147). 
In some cases, the answer to the question “What needs to be done?” will be obvious to 
practitioners (e.g., firefighters, clinical physicians, military commanders, process control 
operators). In these cases, their experiences will be much like that of the firefighters – they 
recognize a familiar situation and they skillfully do the routine activities necessary to get the 
work done (e.g., follow standard procedures). In other cases, the answers may not be so 
obvious. In these cases, it will be necessary for the practitioners to diagnose the problem 
through a trial and error process. It is the diagnosis process that many people have in mind 
when they think about practical decisionmaking. However, diagnosis is happening in both cases. 
In the familiar case it feels more ‘intuitive,’ whereas in the unfamiliar case it feels more 
‘deliberative.’ Do these represent two distinct cognitive processes or do these cases represent a 
single muddling process, adapting to two distinct situations? 
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In observing skilled performance in complex domains, we have begun to wonder 
whether the isolated choices and logical puzzles that provide the basis for much of the 
laboratory research on ‘decisionmaking,’ are representative of the choices made in complex 
work domains. Thus, we have become skeptical about whether the theories of human 
performance based on and motivating this type of laboratory research will have much value for 
improving or supporting performance in these domains. Table 1 contrasts 5 misconceptions 
about decisionmaking that are associated with classical models with the reality experienced by 
people working in complex domains. In discussing the contrasts, we will use examples from 
research in the healthcare domain to ground our hypotheses. 
Table 1. Five misconceptions about cognition in complex work domains. 
Misconceptions Reality 
1 Decisions are independent events. 
Decisions are typically sequentially related 
components in a larger problem solving or search 
process.  
2 A decision stage of information processing can be isolated as an independent open-loop process. 
Decisions are intimate components in a closed-
loop, perception-action dynamic. 
3 There are two independent modes of decisionmaking (System 1 or Intuitive and System 2 or Analytical) 
The qualitative performance distinctions observed 
in decisionmaking are emergent properties of a 
single dynamic process. 
4 Heuristics are biases that result from hard constraints on human information processing capacity.  
Heuristics reflect tricks of the trade in which 
humans leverage problem constraints in intelligent 
ways.  
5 
The ‘muddling through’ processes observed in dealing 
with complex problems should be corrected so that 
people conform better with normative prescriptions from 
mathematical models of rationality.  
The ‘muddling through’ processes observed in 
dealing with complex problems are an intelligent 
response to complexity and this muddling process 
should be encouraged and supported. 
The point of this article is to draw attention to the distinct aspects of skill and expertise 
in complex work domains that are not well represented in traditionally accepted reductionist 
experimental approaches and the associated theories of human rationality and decisionmaking. 
In essence, we are challenging the external validity of the conventional decision literature with 
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respect to generalizing to practical situations [3]. The practical reality that we describe has been 
recognized by many others – who have used various terms to describe it: 
• Abduction (Peirce) [4]
• Assimilation/Accommodation (Piaget) [5]
• Productive Thinking (Dunker, Wertheimer) [6.7]
• Muddling or Incrementalism (Linblum) [8,9]
• Adaptive Control (Flach) [10, 11]
• Recognition-Primed Decision Making (Klein) [12]
• Ecological Rationality (Gigerenzer) [13, 14]
• Situated Cognition (Hutchins, Suchman) [15, 16]
Despite the many surface differences in language and context across these constructs, 
we believe that there are important common intuitions about the dynamics of human 
decisionmaking and problems solving. We hope this discussion will help to illustrate and 
amplify those common intuitions and the potential implications for designing interfaces and 
training programs to enhance human performance in complex work domains. 
1. Decisions are not independent events
An abnormal arterial blood gas may require up to ten separate decisions to 
determine the cause(s) of the abnormality. If the physician sees an average of 
three patients an hour, the total number of these individual decisions on each 
patient requiring a significant workup may go into the hundreds, and the total 
for a shift will be in the thousands. (p. 1185). 
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As Croskerry [17] observes, physicians must typically make many choices in the course 
of a work shift. However, in contrast with decision tasks used in much of the laboratory 
research, these choices are not isolated ‘separate’ or ‘individual decisions.’ Rather, these 
choices are components in a dynamic process to make sense of the situation and to resolve it. 
Thus, the abnormal arterial blood gas is a situation that requires resolution. Achieving 
resolution may require multiple actions, including tests to confirm or rule out hypotheses, 
treatments to resolve or stabilize underlying issues, and/or referrals to appropriate specialists to 
manage further treatment. However, these multiple actions are not ‘independent’ events or 
choices. Rather, they are integral components of a search to find a satisfactory resolution to the 
situation of the abnormal blood gas. 
Research by Feufel [18] suggests that in emergency medicine the resolution process is 
often jointly guided by two heuristics: 1) common thing; and 2) worst thing. The ‘common 
thing’ heuristic will focus on identifying the most common (most probable or most likely) 
reasons for the abnormal situation and on choosing the standard or typical procedures for 
resolving such situations. In this case, tests will typically be chosen in order to provide 
evidence to confirm that the situation is a ‘common thing’ and that the standard procedures are 
appropriate. 
However, at the same time that the emergency physicians are trying to confirm that the 
situation is ‘common,’ they may simultaneously be considering possible hidden dangers (worst 
things). In fact, eliminating potential worst things may be the top priority in the case of 
emergency medicine. In resolving the ‘worst thing’ hypothesis, the physicians are more likely 
to be seeking disconfirming evidence, in order to rule out lower-probability, but dangerous 
possibilities that could lead to dire consequences if missed. For example, an EKG might be 
Flach	et	al.	 20	July	2016	
7	
ordered to rule out an acute myocardial infarction in an older woman presenting with nausea 
and vomiting. 
The key point here is that the choices that physicians make (e.g., to order a particular 
test, to initiate a specific treatment, or to make a specific referral) are not independent decisions, 
rather they are components in a dynamic process of generating and testing hypotheses and 
acting based on an evolving assessment of the situation. In emergency medicine this resolution 
process will often be guided by competing hypotheses about potential “common” and “worst” 
things. 
Figure 1 illustrates two distinct perspectives on decisionmaking. Figure 1A shows the 
conventional model where the decision process is viewed as an open-loop, inferential process 
consistent with models of deduction and/or induction. Figure 1B shows a closed-loop dynamic 
process consistent with Peirce’s abduction [4] and Sowa’s Cognitive Cycle [19].  Abduction is 
a pragmatic approach to evaluating hypotheses (or beliefs) relative to the practical 
consequences of acting on those hypotheses. Beliefs that lead to actions that have satisfying 
results are retained. Otherwise, they are revised to provide a reasonable alternative that is 
consistent with the resulting feedback. This is a kind of learning by doing and is consistent with 
Piaget’s [5] dynamics of assimilation (generalizing from past experiences or schema to 
generate hypotheses and guide action) and accommodation (using feedback to revise schemas 
toward improved fitness with the current situation). In the abduction process, hypotheses direct 
both treatments and tests, and in turn, the hypotheses or underlying beliefs are retained or 
revised as a result of the feedback in terms of unexpected results (surprises) or deviations from 
treatment expectations and goals (errors). A central premise of this article is that the closed-
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loop dynamic of abduction is a more appropriate model for the cognitive processes involved in 
diagnosing and treating patients in a medical context such as the emergency department.  
 
 
Figure 1. This illustrates the difference between an open-loop, inferential logic and a closed-
loop, abduction process in which hypotheses guide actions that have consequences 
that feed back and, in turn, shape beliefs and subsequent hypotheses. See Flach & 
Voorhorst for more detailed description of the abduction dynamic [20].  
 
2. Decisions cannot be isolated from the perception-action dynamic 
De Groot finally succeeded in separating strong from weak players by using 
perceptual tests involving the reproduction of chess positions after brief 
exposure to them (3-7 seconds). The grandmaster was able to reproduce the 
positions perfectly, and performance degraded appreciably with decrease in 
chess ability. De Groot was led to propose that perceptual abilities and 
organization were an important factor in very good play (emphasis added). 
[21] 
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As the above quote suggests, quality choices of expert chess players often involve what 
Dreyfus describes as a perceptual process of ‘zeroing-in’ on a promising situation. Dreyfus 
notes that “only after the player has zeroed in on an area does he begin to count-out, to test, 
what he can do from there” [22]. He continues, observing that “the human player… is not 
aware of having explicitly excluded from consideration any of the hundreds of possibilities that 
would have had to have been enumerated in order to arrive at a particular relevant area of the 
board by counting out” [22]. In generalizing this to emergency medicine, in applying the 
‘common thing’ and/or ‘worst thing’ heuristics the physician is delimiting the space of 
possibilities that will be considered. Thus, with experience, a skilled clinician will quickly zero-
in on or recognize a few of the most likely possibilities associated with a particular case. 
Winograd and Flores [2] make a similar observation about management decisions, 
noting that in the process of formulating the problem there is a “pre-orientation of possibilities” 
that simultaneously reveals some possible actions while concealing others. As noted earlier, 
Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model also reflects the observation that perception 
(or recognition) of the situation plays a critical role in expert decisionmaking [12].  He noted 
that the choices of the experienced fire commanders rarely involved comparing alternatives, 
rather they involved assessing the situation and testing hypotheses. Klein observed that in high-
risk situations, these hypotheses were often tested through ‘mental simulations,’ which 
involved imagining a course of action and the potential consequences. This process seems to be 
analogous to the “progressive deepening” process of sequentially evaluating and accepting or 
rejecting alternatives described by Gestalt psychologists [6,7]. This process is self-terminating 
upon discovering the first acceptable (or satisfying) hypothesis. Ultimately, the hypotheses will 
be tested by acting on them. In domains such as medicine, where windows of opportunity for 
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successful action may be closing rapidly – there may be limited time for extensive mental 
simulations and decisive action may supersede the requirement for certainty. . 
In contrast to these observations of decisionmaking in complex domains, laboratory 
research on decisionmaking has typically focused on processes associated with comparing 
alternatives. Participants are typically presented with a pre-determined set consisting of a few 
alternatives and are asked to choose the best one [23]. This allows the choice processes to be 
isolated from perceptual and memory processes that would normally be involved in generating 
alternatives. Performance of the participants is typically gauged relative to normative models 
for identifying the ‘optimal’ or ‘rational’ choice from among the fixed set of alternatives. 
Deviations from the prescriptions of the normative models are generally considered to be 
errors; and there is an at least implicit implication that these errors might be corrected by 
teaching people the normative models. However, there is little empirical evidence to support 
the idea that training with respect to normative models of rationality improves performance in 
complex domains [24, 25]. 
In addition to isolating the choice process from the perceptual aspects of problem 
formulation, the laboratory tasks typically used to evaluate decisionmaking involve bounded 
problems, where the set of alternatives is fixed and the number of variables to consider is 
typically well within-the capacity of working memory. However, in domains such as healthcare, 
the problems are typically dynamic. As Montgomery noted, potentially “useful information is 
available in overwhelming quantities, and physicians have the daily task of sorting through it 
and deciding how some part applies to an individual patient in a given circumstance” [26]. It 
often takes time to access relevant information and in some cases it is necessary to act quickly, 
before all the potentially relevant information is available in order for the actions to be effective 
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in preventing an evolving dangerous situation. For example, time is critical in treating sepsis or 
septic shock in both the ED and Neonatal Intensive Care [27, 28]. Research suggests that 
delays in the administration of antibiotics can result in significantly increased mortality rates 
[29]. 
Research by Damasio [30, 31] highlights a potential problem with purely ‘rational’ 
approaches to decisionmaking – these rational processes can get caught in a paralysis of 
analysis, where actions are delayed by excessive deliberations. Unlike many of the heuristics 
used by experts, normative approaches to rationality don’t have intrinsic ‘stop rules’ for 
terminating the evaluation process and acting. In many dynamic situations a bias toward action 
can be essential to resolving problems. Damasio’s work suggests that emotional components 
may play an important role in tuning the criteria for intuitively triggering action in dynamic 
situations (for similar arguments see Simon [32]). 
The key point here is that the process of comparing options that is typically the focus of 
laboratory research on decisionmaking seems to account for very little of the variance that 
separates experts from novices with respect to quality of practice in a domain such as medicine. 
Rather, it seems that the perceptual processes associated with formulating the problem, 
generating hypotheses, and triggering actions are critical factors for effective performance in 
complex work domains. For example, with respect to the common and worst thing heuristics, 
this would suggest that a key distinction between expert and novice physicians would be the 
sets of alternative ‘common’ and ‘worst’ things that they generate and the relative emphasis 
(weighting) that they give to the different alternatives. Thus, in isolating the ‘choice’ 
processing from other components of the perception-action dynamic, it is likely that researchers 
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have broken the cognitive dynamic in a way that undermines its relevance for the design of 
training protocols or interfaces to improve the quality of medical practice.	The	distinction	between	knowledge	and	the	situated	skill	of	muddling	is	implicitly	recognized	within	accreditation	requirements	for	post-graduate	physician	training	programs	that	lead	to	specialty	board	certification.		All	such	programs	include	both	exam-based	assessment	biased	towards	knowledge	(open-loop,	rule-based	logic)	and	mentoring-based	assessment	whereby	expert	faculty	guide	and	judge	the	degree	to	which	novice	trainees	develop	effective	muddling	skills.		Trainees	require	satisfactory	performance	in	both	domains	in	order	to	progress.		This	is	equally	true	for	those	specialties	with	a	predominantly	cognitive	skillset,	such	as	internal	medicine,	as	for	surgical	specialties,	which	have	a	perhaps	more	obvious	need	for	practical	assessment.	
3. The Muddling Process is an integrated adaptive control system, rather than two
distinct processing paths. 
In attempting to account for the qualitative differences between the behavior of domain 
experts such as the fire ground commanders interviewed by Klein and the normative 
expectations that shape much of the classical laboratory research, some have proposed that 
there are dual processes or separate systems underlying choice behaviors [23, 33, 34]. Choices 
that are made automatically, under high time pressure, with little apparent deliberation, are 
called intuitive or System 1 decisions. This system typically relies on heuristics that put 
minimal demands on cognitive resources (e.g., working memory) and that allow quick 
decisions/actions. However, this path often involves systematic deviations from normative 
prescriptions for integrating the data. 
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Choices that involve more extended time allowing more thorough deliberations are 
called analytical or System 2 decisions. This system tends to be slow and it puts heavy demands 
on cognitive resources. However, this system typically conforms more closely to the normative 
prescriptions for integration of the evidence available. The operation of this system is what 
most people typically have in mind when they talk about decisionmaking. 
While System 1 is often associated with skill or expertise, there is at least an implicit 
assumption that with respect to rationality this system is more vulnerable than System 2. For 
example, Croskerry claims that “robust decision making is more analytical than intuitive. It 
adopts a systematic approach to remove uncertainty within the resources available to make safe 
and effective decisions” [35]. Despite its weakness, employing System 1 is often necessary or 
preferred due to constraints on time (e.g., need for quick action) or available cognitive 
resources (e.g., multi-tasking). A critical question with respect to the quality of decisionmaking 
is how to resolve potential conflicts between these two systems. For example, are there 
situations when a clinician should ‘slow down’ (employ the analytic system) in order to avoid 
potential errors associated with the intuitive system [36]? 
Although Systems 1 and 2 are often discussed as distinct systems due to the qualitative 
differences, we think that it is misleading to infer that the qualitatively different experiences 
associated with ‘intuitive’ and ‘deliberative’ situations reflect distinct, independent cognitive 
processes. In practice, the coupling of these two processes will be critical in determining the 
quality of performance as Moulton, Reegher, Mylopoulos, and MacRae [36] observe: 
Although gaining an understanding of both the cognitively effortful, analytic 
processes and the automatic, nonanalytic resources of expertise is important it 
might be argued ... that the true hallmark of expertise may be the effective 
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interfacing between these two modes of processing. When a clinical presentation 
is atypical, a postoperative patient goes off course, an unusual reaction occurs 
from medication, or an anatomical anomaly is confronted, will the clinician, in 
automatic mode, take heed and recognize the intricacies and complexities of the 
case and leave automatic mode, or will the clinician plow through, oblivious to 
its uniqueness and unaware of its consequences?  
Figure 2 illustrates abduction as a kind of adaptive control system where performance is 
a function of two intimately coupled loops. The lower or inner loop reflects Piaget’s 
assimilation process. This loop provides a direct coupling of perception and action, such that 
action is directly modulated by feedback (i.e., observations of the consequences of prior 
actions). The feedback in this loop reflects deviations from a desired state (e.g., certainty about 
condition and/or resolution of health problems) and the actions (e.g., tests and/or treatments) 
are guided by hypotheses and heuristics (or schema) with the ultimate intention to reduce  
‘errors’ relative to this desired state.  
	  
Figure 2. The abductive or muddling process involves two coupled loops in the 
form of an adaptive control system.  
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The upper or outer loop in Figure 2 reflects Piaget’s accommodation process. This loop 
functions as a monitor/critic/supervisor of the inner loop. In essence, this loop monitors the 
inner loop activity to detect anomalies or surprises. When anomalies are detected, the outer 
loop modifies the inner loop, with the goal to bring the inner loop process back in line with 
goals and expectations. A surprise might typically indicate that the hypothesis set guiding inner 
loop actions is wrong or incomplete. Thus, modifications to the inner loop might typically 
involve changes to the assumptions (e.g., heuristics and/or hypotheses) that are directing 
actions in the inner loop (e.g. switching emphasis from common to worst thing or adding 
alternatives to the lists of things being considered). 
There are two important implications of the adaptive control model in Figure 2 relative 
to dual process theories of decisionmaking. First, the two loops in Figure 2 are always working 
together as a single unified process. That is, there is no sense in which individual loops can be 
turned on or off. However, it will be true that when no anomalies are detected the process in 
Figure 2 will be experienced as a simple control process – a process of just doing the job, 
guided by feedback. In this case, the outer loop will be in the background and there is likely to 
be little conscious experience of deliberation or uncertainty. However, when anomalies are 
detected – either as a conscious recognition of surprise or as a vague feeling that things are not 
going as expected – then the activity of the outer loop to evaluate and modify the set of 
potential hypotheses is more likely to be part of the conscious experience. The key point is that 
the monitoring process is continuously working in the background, even when it is not 
consciously experienced. As Moulton, Regehr, Mylopoulus and MacRae note “at any given 
moment in time, attention needs to be allocated to monitoring the environment for unexpected 
and unanticipated cues, as well as for assessing results of actions already taken” [36]. 
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The second important implication of the model in Figure 2 is that the coordination of 
the two loops is largely a function of perception/attention, NOT a function of rationality or 
conscious choice. That is, activity of the outer loop is contingent on detecting anomalies 
relative to expectations about the inner loop. In other words, the decision to slow down is also 
recognition-primed. The coordination between the two loops is a problem of situation 
awareness. As Moulton Regehr, Mylopoulos and MacRae [36] note, errors are often not due to 
failures of rationality, but to incomplete assessments of the situation: 
Often, the decision made in a critical situation was the correct decision given 
the parameters that the individual was considering, but the parameters 
themselves were wrong or incomplete because of failures of situation awareness. 
Poor situation awareness has also been considered a primary causal factor for 
error in many diverse domains, including medical dispatch, medical diagnosis 
and anesthesia. 
In sum, the main point here is that although the experiences of decision makers can vary on a 
continuum from feeling like a well tuned control process (e.g., just doing the job) to a more 
deliberate search to make sense of and manage an uncertain situation, the underlying 
perception-action process is a single multi-loop muddling process, rather than a collection of 
distinct or independent processes. The qualitative differences in experience do not reflect 
distinct internal cognitive processes or mechanisms, but rather adaptive responses to distinct 
situations (e.g., familiar versus unfamiliar). 
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4. Heuristics: Biases or Tricks of the Trade
It is generally recognized that heuristics are essential to skilled performance. In essence, 
heuristics are the tricks of the trade that allow experts to quickly recognize a situation in order 
to select or ‘prime’ the right action from among a myriad of choices. However, these tricks of 
the trade are bounded or situated. That is, heuristics are a local form of rationality that are only 
valid in certain situations, as opposed to many of the normative models underlying classical 
experimental approaches to decisionmaking that are considered to be universally valid, or 
context independent [13]. 
In the classical approach, much attention is paid to the limitations of heuristics. So 
much so that these are often seen as synonymous with bias. Further, they are viewed as 
significant sources of error in human decisionmaking that need to be corrected through training 
[23]. The reliance on heuristics is treated as a factor that undermines the quality of System 1 
and makes it the weaker of the two distinct modes associated with the classical model. This 
leads to the conclusion that people should be trained to not put too much trust in System 1 and 
to defer to System 2 whenever time and circumstances allow. The rub, however, is how to 
recognize when time and circumstances allow. Consider Croskerry’s observation about 
heuristics (or Cognitive Dispositions to Respond - CDR) in medicine: 
It should be emphasized that the CDR, itself, is neither a failing nor an error; it 
is only when CDRs result in adverse outcomes that they become cognitive errors. 
Interestingly, virtually every cognitive error is judged preventable in hindsight. 
[17] 
While it may be easy to recognize that a heuristic has been over extended or over 
generalized in hindsight (i.e., after an unfortunate result), expert performance requires the 
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ability to detect the bounds of the heuristic in foresight. This	type	of	sensitivity	to	the	contextual	limitations	of	different	heuristics	may	be	in	part	what	pilots	call	‘situation	awareness’	and	physicians	commonly	refer	to	as	‘good	judgment’	[37].  In the adaptive 
control model, this is the function of the outer metacognitive loop, to see the bigger picture and 
to detect when there are anomalies that indicate that the heuristics guiding the activities no 
longer fit the current situation. 
In the context of the adaptive control model, heuristics are considered to be an 
ecologically rational basis for linking perception and action in the inner control loop [13, 14, 
20]. In other words, heuristics are Smart Mechanisms that cleverly use local constraints to 
simplify complex problems and to trigger skilled action [38]. A primary function of the outer 
loop is to detect when the bounds limiting the applicability of a heuristic are crossed (i.e., 
detect anomalies relative to expectations) in order to adjust the logic guiding behavior in the 
inner loop (e.g., change the hypothesis set or switch heuristics). 
There are two important points to consider when evaluating heuristics relative to 
normative prescriptions for decisionmaking. First, it is important to realize that normative 
prescriptions are also pragmatically ‘bounded’ forms of rationality. In particular, the normative 
approaches are bounded by the quality of data that they are applied to [13, 14]. For the most 
part, the normative prescriptions apply to the ‘counting-out’ aspect of the decision process – 
(i.e., evaluating or comparing alternatives). However, the data available to the counting-out 
process is a function of the prior ‘zeroing-in’ process. Even if the comparison or evaluation 
process conforms exactly with normative prescriptions, the decision may be flawed if the 
correct diagnosis is not in the set of alternatives being considered or if the data about the patient 
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state are noisy/erroneous or incomplete. Practically, there is no ‘unbounded’ rationality – so the 
key is to choose the process that fits best with the situated constraints. 
The second point to consider when comparing heuristics to normative prescriptions has 
to do with the dynamic or temporal constraints in domains such as medicine that have been 
eluded to earlier (e.g., the need for quick action in the case of sepsis). The practical heuristics 
that guide expert behavior typically have the dynamic constraints baked in. That is, these 
heuristics are often in the form of recipes for action – if you suspect sepsis, administer 
antibiotics at the earliest opportunity. Normative models that were designed to be universal are 
rarely grounded in the pragmatic dynamics of specific domains such as medicine. Thus, they 
lack the ‘stop-rules’ necessary to prevent interminable analyses that may ultimately find the 
right answer, but that may be too late for the actions to be effective. For example, waiting for a 
suspicion of sepsis to be confirmed by lab reports before administering antibiotics.  
Finally, in making judgments about the quality of decision processes that result in bad 
outcomes, it is important to realize that information that may be salient in hindsight, may not 
have been salient at the time decisions were made. It is also important to realize that it may be 
difficult to fully appreciate the dynamic constraints (e.g., sense of urgency) being experienced 
by a physician from the perspective of hindsight. Interventions to improve decisionmaking and 
to prevent future bad outcomes that are based on such hindsight biases are not likely to be 
effective in improving the healthcare system [39]. 
5. Muddling Through: Something to be corrected or supported?
Twenty years after describing public policy making as an incremental, muddling 
through process [8, 9], Lindblom reviewed the literature and found that there was general 
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consensus that his description of ‘muddling’ was an accurate account of how public policy 
making typically happened [e.g., see Weick’s [40] discussion of sensemaking in organizations . 
However, there remained significant disagreement about how public policy making ‘ought’ to 
happen. He observed that many people believed that the process could be improved (i.e., fixed) 
by making it conform more closely to the normative models. In contrast, Lindblom believed 
that the muddling through process was actually a very effective process for solving complex 
problems. In other words, he believed that the muddling through process was a valid, 
ecologically rational approach to making public policy. He suggested that efforts to improve 
policy making should focus on supporting or tuning the muddling process, rather than on 
supplanting it in favor of more normatively rational processes. 
Lindblom’s hypotheses about public policy making and Weick’s descriptions of 
sensemaking are consistent with the themes of this paper. Thus, we would like to consider two 
implications for improving the quality of practice. The first implication is that decisions are 
ultimately made by organizations, not individuals. For example, Hutchins makes a strong case 
that, for ship control, the navigation team along with their tools is the cognitive and 
computational system [15]. In the medical context we suggest that treatment decisions are 
ultimately made by the Emergency Department (ED), not by an isolated individual physician. 
To be more specific, we suggest that both the assimilation and accommodation functions 
illustrated in Figure 2 are distributed over people and technology in the ED. Typically there is a 
supervisory hierarchy in the ED with senior physicians monitoring the activity of junior 
physicians. Thus, the senior physicians play an important role with respect to the metacognitive 
critic function (upper loop), monitoring for anomalies and helping to ensure that the heuristics 
guiding the activities of the junior physicians (lower loop) are appropriate to the situations. In a 
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high functioning ED, this sharing of responsibility to alert colleagues to potential anomalies 
that might reflect the bounds of a dominant heuristic or typical situation is likely to go beyond 
the formal hierarchies, so that every one in the ED feels empowered and responsible to voice 
concerns with respect to the activities of their colleagues. 
This suggests that the attunement of the muddling process (e.g., the ability to detect 
anomalies or sensitivity to the local limits of a heuristic) will depend on communications within 
organizations. Recent research on group problem solving supports this [41]. This research 
found that the quality of group problem solving depended critically on listening and turn taking 
within the group. The research showed that indexes of social sensitivity were more important to 
the quality of group problem solving than were indexes of intelligence. This has particularly 
important implications for the medical field, where Leape and colleagues have suggested that 
the insensitivity of physicians (e.g., lack of respect for colleagues) is a major contributing 
factor to medical error [42, 43]. Feufel also found the ability to establish rapport and to listen to 
patients was a critical skill for ED physicians [18]. 
Thus, an important implication of the distributed nature of cognition in complex 
systems like the ED is that ‘non-technical’ skills (e.g., social sensitivity, leadership, team 
coordination) may be as important to the ultimate quality of performance and safety as are 
technical skills (e.g., knowledge, analytical reasoning ability) [44, 45]. This suggests that 
increasing emphasis on attributes such as social sensitivity in the selection and training of 
medical personnel may lead to significant improvements in the quality of performance. Of 
course, having smart people in the organization is valuable, but an organization that functions 
well as a team (e.g., based on mutual respect) has the potential to be even smarter than any of 
its individual members. 
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A second dimension to consider relative to incremental, muddling through processes is 
associated with the construct of essential friction [46]. In an organization, checks and balances 
(e.g., the requirement to get approval from the attending physician before acting; or the second 
guessing of a colleague) can sometimes be seen as friction. From the perspective of efficiency, 
these checks can be seen as wasted time or energy. But in an uncertain environment, this 
friction may be an essential part of the metacognitive process, helping to ensure that anomalies 
are detected and that the local limitations of heuristics are respected; and thus, reducing the 
probability that the system will plow ahead following a heuristic that is not well fit to an 
exceptional situation. We suggest that this friction can be a more practically valid check on the 
limitations of heuristics, than education with respect to formal logic. 
Note that this might seem somewhat at odds with the discussion above that suggests that 
one of the values of heuristics is that they are recipes for action and they help to protect the 
system against a paralysis of analysis. However, this illustrates an emergent property of all 
closed-loop, adaptive systems. Stability in these systems depends on a delicate ‘speed-accuracy’ 
balance.  These systems can fail either because they are too sluggish in acting to correct 
problems (e.g., paralysis of analysis or gain too low), or because they act too quickly and end 
up chasing noise rather than signal (e.g., misdiagnosing the problem and treating the wrong 
thing or gain too high). It is the ability to find and maintain the right balance that distinguishes 
high reliability organizations. 
The question of the nature and appropriate level of friction is particularly timely for 
medicine with the increasing development and use of technologies, such as Electronic Health 
Record (EHR) systems. Such systems are often motivated by opportunities to increase 
efficiency.  However, Rochlin [47] cautions that a system that makes it easier to do the right 
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thing, may also make it easier to do the wrong thing. In designing and implementing EHRs, it 
will be important to consider whether important checks and balances are being by-passed, and 
also to consider how the current systems might provide the opportunity for additional friction 
(checks and balances) that may increase system reliability [48, 49]. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Consistent with Lindblom’s observations about the messy, muddling (but effective) 
nature of public policy making, there is growing consensus in the applied cognitive science 
literature about the opportunistic or situated nature of decisionmaking and problem solving in 
complex domains. In these contexts, experts tend to rely heavily on heuristics or rules of thumb 
that have worked consistently in the past, because they have been tuned over time to the 
functional constraints of the work. It is also fairly evident that failures are often associated with 
over generalizing these heuristics in exceptional situations where they don’t fit. The point of 
contention, reflected in the contrasts in Table 1, are about the most effective ways for 
improving performance (i.e., reducing the over generalizations and failures). 
The classical approach tends to focus on deviations between the heuristics and more 
context-free, analytical approaches to rationality. Advocates of this approach tend to attribute 
these deviations to limitations in human information processing capacity (e.g., limited working 
memory). The implications for improving the process tend toward either training humans to be 
more aware of the limits of general heuristics relative to the logical norms; or replacing humans 
with automated systems that are designed to conform with the logical norms of rationality. 
The alternative, muddling through approach tends to focus on the challenge of 
achieving the right balance between speed and accuracy in a self-organizing system [20]. This 
balance depends critically on the pick-up of information (i.e., perception or attunement). Is the 
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organization tuned to the right information for guiding activity in the lower loop? Are 
appropriate checks in place for detecting the bounds of particular heuristics (specific exceptions 
to the rules, anomalies) to support the metacognitive critic that monitors and adjusts the logic of 
the inner loop (e.g., changes hypotheses or shifts heuristics)? Thus, the focus shifts from 
improving the internal logic or rationality to improving the pick-up of information (e.g., 
through improved sensors, attention/situation awareness, interface design, and communications 
[50, 51, 52, 53, 54,55]). 
The dynamical systems approach also shifts focus from the limitations of individual 
people to the power of distributed teams. This suggests that selecting for social sensitivity and 
teaching people communication and teamwork skills can be very important avenues for 
improving systems performance. Similarly, if work is to be supported by technology, its effect 
on team and/or organizational performance should also be considered rather than individual 
level outcomes alone [44, 45, 53,54].  
The practical questions are why do failures happen and how can we reduce the potential 
for future failures? The classical approach focuses on how individuals ‘think’ and on ways to 
improve thinking.  The alternative approach focuses on how people ‘see and listen’ and on 
ways to improve seeing and listening.  To be clear, the implication of the alternative approach 
is not that ‘thinking’ is unimportant. But rather that it is not enough. For example, Asch et al. 
[56] found that patient outcomes were related to aspects of residency training other than the
licensing exam scores. Thus, the differentiator for predicting physician skill was not knowledge 
as measured by the licensing exams. For the medical domain, the quality of thinking is 
generally quite high.  However, there may be significant room for improvement with respect to 
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seeing (e.g., tuning to anomalies that reflect the situated bounds of standard procedures and 
heuristics) and listening (e.g., respecting and communicating with colleagues and patients). 
An important leverage that designers have for improving performance and reducing 
errors for an adaptive (abduction based) muddling through rationality is the design of 
representations [e.g., 47, 57, 58]. This includes shaping external representations (interface 
design) and shaping internal representations (training system design) – to increase the 
salience/awareness of both the feedback relative to controlling action and the feedback relative 
to detecting anomalies and exceptions (e.g., the situated bounds of heuristics) to trigger a 
change of hypotheses or heuristics. The ultimate goal is not to make the system more logical in 
the classical sense, but to make it more perspicacious. 
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